Jamis M. Johnson v. Jayson Orvis : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2004
Jamis M. Johnson v. Jayson Orvis : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jamis M. Johnson; Appellant Pro Se.
Peggy A. Tomsic; Tomsic & Peck; Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee.
Jamis M. Johnson Appellant Pro Se 352 South Denver Street, Suite 304 Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 530-0100 Fax: (801) 530-0900 Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
Peggy A. Tomsic (3879) Tomsic & Peck LLC 136 East South Temple, Suite 800 Salt Lake City, Utah
84111 Telephone: (801) 532-1995 Fax: (801) 532-4202 Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Johnson v. Orvis, No. 20041040 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2004).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/5400
}•?!:' UTAH COURT OP APPPA] 
•sl'\TI- O l ' l H A ; 
' A . . 1 1 , "XT.- O A / 
OF 4PPF.I J ,F§' 
BMP 
Peggy A. Tc 
"1 omsic & P^  
136 East ' 
Sail Lake t 
Tele 
Attorn s.omevs for I: 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMIS M. JOHNSON, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
vs. 
JAYSON ORVIS, 
Plaintiff/Appellee. 
Case No. 20041040 - CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, CASE NO. 020904919 
THE HONORABLE TYRONE MEDLEY PRESIDING 
Jamis M. Johnson 
Appellant Pro Se 
352 South Denver Street, Suite 304 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 530-0100 
Fax: (801) 530-0900 
Peggy A. Tomsic (3879) 
Tomsic & Peck LLC 
136 East South Temple, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1995 
Fax: (801) 532-4202 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT iii 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES iii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE vi 
STATEMENT OF FACTS viii 
A. Assignment of Belding Judgment to Plaintiff Orvis, Orvis's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Johnson's Motion to Strike viii 
B. Orvis' Motion for Protective Order and Attorneys' Fees xii 
C. Johnson's Rule 11 Motion xiii 
D. Proceedings Before Judge Hanson xvii 
ARGUMENT 1 
I. ORVIS IS ENTITLED TO RENEWAL OF THE BELDING JUDGMENT, AS A 
MATTER OF LAW, AND JOHNSON'S ALLEGATIONS FLOWING FROM 
AN ALLEGED PARTNERSHIP WITH ORVIS ARE IRRELEVANT AND IMMATERIAL. 
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II. SHOULD THE COURT, CONTRARY TO UTAH LAW, FIND THAT 
JOHNSON'S ALLEGATIONS WITH RESPECT TO A PARTNERSHIP 
INTEREST WITH ORVIS ARE MATERIAL, THESE ALLEGATIONS ARE 
NONETHELESS BARRED BY RES JUDICATA UNDER JUDGE HANSON'S 
RULING OF NO PARTNERSHIP 5 
III. JUDGE MEDLEY DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETION IN DECLINING 
TO GRANT JOHNSON'S MOTION TO STRIKE 8 
IV. JUDGE MEDLEY DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETION IN ISSUING A 
PROTECTIVE ORDER AND AWARDING ORVIS HIS ATTORNEYS' 
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code § 78-2-2(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Issue Number 1: Was Judge Medley correct in renewing a judgment validly 
assigned to plaintiff/appellee Orvis when Orvis brought an action to renew the judgment 
within the eight years provided by Utah statute? 
This issue was preserved. [R. at 32-36]l 
This Court reviews Judge Medley's grant of summary judgment for correctness. 
Young v. Salt Lake Citv Sch. Dist.. 2002 UT 64. If 10. 52 P.3d 1230. 
Issue Number 2: Was Judge Medley correct in rejecting defendant/appellant 
Johnson's attack on the assignment of a judgment to Orvis because the purchaser and 
assigner of the judgment was an administratively dissolved corporation when Utah law 
holds that the acts of an administratively dissolved corporation are merely voidable and 
not void and are only voidable by the parties to those acts, and that Johnson, not a party 
to the assignment, therefore had no standing to attack the assignment? 
This issue was preserved. [R. at 459-65] 
This Court reviews Judge Medley's legal conclusions for correctness. Id. 
Issue Number 3: Did Judge Medley abuse his discretion in declining to strike a 
reply and affidavit submitted by Orvis when the reply and affidavit were filed to counter 
]The reference to "R." in the citation is to the record in the district court as 
paginated by the district court clerk. 
in 
an equitable case Johnson was attempting to make on Johnson's behalf, were not 
submitted for any improper purpose, and were not relied upon by Judge Medley in 
rendering his decision on summary judgment? 
This issue was preserved. [R. at 590-602] 
This Court reviews Judge Medley's decision to deny Johnson's motion to strike 
for abuse of discretion. State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59. % 16. 6 P.3d 1120. 
Issue Number 4: Did Judge Medley abuse his discretion in granting a protective 
order and awarding attorneys' fees to Orvis when Johnson served a notice of depositions 
on counsel for Orvis at 6:00 p.m. on the night before the first scheduled deposition? 
This issue was preserved. [R. at 756-59] 
This Court reviews Judge Medley's decision to grant a protective order and award 
attorneys' fees for abuse of discretion. First Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Schamanek, 
684 P.2d 1257, 1266 (Utah 1984).2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In 2001, Orvis purchased a judgment owned by a plaintiff, Pamela Belding, 
against Johnson. [R. 46-50] This judgment was set to expire under Utah law, and, 
accordingly, Orvis filed a complaint to renew it. The case was assigned to the Honorable 
Tyrone Medley. [R. 1-3] 
2Johnson did not appeal Judge Medley's order denying Johnson's motion for Rule 
11 sanctions. Even so, Johnson briefed that issue in his opening brief. While that issue is 
not properly before the Court, Orvis has briefed the issue in the event the Court considers 
that issue on appeal. 
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In March of 2004, Orvis filed a motion for summary judgment seeking to renew 
the judgment. [R. 29-75] The supporting memorandum was four pages long and simply 
cited to the law regarding renewal of judgment. [R. 32-36] In response, Johnson filed a 
13 page opposition and affidavit with voluminous exhibits alleging all manner of facts 
against Orvis that were entirely irrelevant to the legal question of whether the judgment 
should be renewed. [R. 97-452] These facts included all of those Johnson alleges here 
on appeal regarding an alleged partnership between Johnson and Orvis. [Id.] At the 
time, the question of whether there existed such a partnership was pending in a 
declaratory action before Judge Timothy Hanson.3 [R.460] 
In response to Johnson's opposition, Orvis filed a reply and an affidavit of a 
private investigator hired by Orvis' counsel to investigate the financial affairs of 
Johnson. [459-579] The substance of the affidavit was that Johnson had intentionally 
structured his financial life so as to be completely immune from his many creditors, 
including the Internal Revenue Service and the Utah State Tax Commission. [Id.] 
Johnson filed a motion to strike Orvis's reply and the affidavit. [580-589] On 
October 26, 2004, Judge Medley granted Orvis's motion for summary judgment and 
Subsequent to the resolution of the instant case, Judge Hanson ruled on summary 
judgment that no such partnership exists. [R. at 1055-1060] Orvis maintains that none of 
Johnson's allegations regarding an alleged partnership with Orvis are material to the legal 
question of whether the Belding judgment should be renewed; however, should the Court 
deem otherwise, all of these allegations are nonetheless barred under the doctrine of res 
judicata by Judge Hanson's determination that there was no partnership. See infra at pp. 
4-6. Judge Hanson's decision is currently on appeal by Johnson before this Court. 
Johnson v. Orvis, Appeal No. 2004112-CA. 
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denied Johnson's motion to strike, holding that the question of whether the Belding 
judgment should be renewed was a simple question of law and that Orvis had replied and 
submitted the affidavit to counter an equitable case that Johnson appeared to be 
attempting to make in his favor. [R. at 807-808, 1175-77] 
Despite the fact that a motion for summary judgment was pending, Johnson 
sought discovery from Orvis, and, in one instance, filed a notice of deposition on Orvis' 
counsel at 6:00 p.m. for a deposition scheduled for the following morning. [777-779] 
Orvis moved for a protective order and attorneys' fees and was granted both by Judge 
Medley. [756-759,766-768,773-787,816-818] 
Finally, Johnson filed a Rule 11 motion against counsel for Orvis based on the 
fact the private investigator hired by counsel to investigate Johnson's financial affairs 
was not licensed by the State of Utah. [862-1045] On March 14, 2005, Judge Medley 
denied Johnson's Rule 11 motion holding that Orvis' counsel was not aware that the 
vi 
investigator was not licensed and did not submit the affidavit for any improper purpose. 
[R. at 1172-78] 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Assignment of Belding Judgment to Plaintiff Orvis, Orvis's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Johnson's Motion to Strike 
On April 5, 1995, a judgment was entered in favor of plaintiff Pamela Belding 
against Johnson by the Fourth Judicial District Court, Provo Department, Utah County, 
State of Utah in the amount of $192,289.01 plus accrued interest. [R. at 42-44] On 
August 23, 2001, Ms. Belding assigned her interest in the judgment to All Star Financial, 
L.L.C. ("All Star Financial") without reservation (the "Belding judgment"). [R. at 46] 
On August 24, 2001, All Star Financial assigned the Belding judgment to Orvis. [R. at 
50]4 
Orvis, on June 7, 2002, filed a complaint to renew the Belding judgment to 
prevent it from expiring under the eight year statutory limit set forth under Utah law. [R. 
at 1-3] 
Johnson answered the complaint on July 16, 2002, and also filed a counterclaim 
making numerous allegations against Orvis all based on an alleged partnership between 
Johnson or Johnson and his wife DaNell Johnson and Orvis with respect to certain credit 
repair entities owned by Orvis; Johnson alleged, for example, that the Belding judgment 
4In July of 2001, All Star Financial was administratively dissolved by the State of 
Utah. [R. at 102] Orvis had no ownership interest in and was not aware of the 
administrative status of All Star Financial. [R. at 461] 
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was purchased with embezzled partnership assets and that Orvis breached his fiduciary 
duty as partner to Johnson in purchasing the Belding judgment. [R. at 9-18] 
More than a year and a half after Johnson filed his answer and counterclaim, 
Orvis, on March 26, 2004, moved for summary judgment, requesting that the Belding 
Judgment be renewed. [R. at 29-35] In Orvis' supporting memorandum, Orvis argued 
that Johnson's allegations in his answer and counterclaim regarding a partnership with 
Orvis were entirely irrelevant to the case's resolution, and that the only relevant 
questions were (1) was the judgment entered, (2) was the judgment assigned, and (3) did 
Orvis bring the action within eight years after entry of judgment. [R. at 34] 
Johnson, 2 1/2 months after Orvis filed the motion for summary judgment, filed a 
13 page opposition and affidavit with voluminous exhibits making the same allegations 
against Orvis that he made in his answer and counterclaim about an alleged partnership 
with Orvis and argued that Judge Medley should not renew the Belding judgment based 
on those allegations. [R. at 97-452] As a legal matter, Johnson argued that Judge 
Medley should not renew the Belding judgment because All Star Financial had been 
administratively dissolved by the State of Utah shortly before it purchased and then 
assigned the Belding judgment to Orvis. [R. at 104-06] 
Orvis timely filed a reply to Johnson's opposition. [R. at 459-65] In this reply, 
Orvis argued that the fact All Star Financial was administratively dissolved when it 
purchased and assigned the Belding judgment was no bar to its renewal, relying on 
Miller v. Celebration Mining Co.. 2001 UT 64. ^ f 6. 29 P.3d 123 L where the Supreme 
viii 
Court of Utah held that a contract entered into by an administratively dissolved 
corporation is not void, but voidable, by the other party(ies) to that contract, and Paradise 
Creations, Inc. v. UV Sales. Inc. 315 F.3d 1293, 1310 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2003), which cited 
to Miller as "holding that under Utah law, a contract entered into by an administratively 
dissolved corporation may be voided by the other party to the contract, but is not 
automatically void." [R. at 461-62] Also as part of his reply, Orvis attached the affidavit 
of William F. Crawley, who had been hired by Orvis' counsel to investigate Johnson's 
financial affairs ("Crawley affidavit"). The Crawley affidavit listed such facts as that 
Johnson resided in a house the current tax value of which exceeded $850,000 and that 
Johnson had federal and state tax liens filed against him totaling over $1.9 million. [R. at 
467] 
On June 22, 2004, Johnson filed a motion to strike Orvis's reply and the Crawley 
affidavit [R. at 580-81] 
Judge Medley held a hearing on Orvis' motion for summary judgment and 
Johnson's motion to strike on October 15, 2004. [R. at 1114] At this hearing, Judge 
Medley granted Orvis' motion for summary judgment. Specifically, Judge Medley held: 
I'm satisfied that the motion for summary judgement is in fact, very well taken 
and quite frankly narrow. I mean it seeks renewal of the judgment because of its 
narrow scope and in this court's view the criteria to be considered is reasonably 
narrow and in this court's view it is, in fact, undisputed again from my vantage 
point that the complaint to renew the judgement was timely filed. 
[R. 1114 at 32-33] 
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With respect to Johnson's allegations against Orvis related to the alleged 
partnership in Orvis' credit repair entities, Judge Medley found: 
These issues raised by Mr. Johnson and all of the issues raised by Mr. Johnson as 
they relate to the partnership I'm finding to be immaterial to the actual renewal of 
the judgement itself.. . . 
[R. 1114 at 33] 
With respect to Johnson's attacks on the Belding judgment because of the 
administrative status of All Star Financial, Judge Medley held that the issue was 
governed by Miller v. Celebration Mining Co.. 29 P.3d 1231 (Utah 2001). where the 
Supreme Court of Utah held that a contract entered into by an administratively dissolved 
corporation is not void, but merely voidable by the parties to the contract; as Johnson was 
not a party to the contract, Judge Medley held that he had no standing to challenge it: 
That the assignments for a certain purpose of judgement renewal were in fact and 
are in fact valid and consistent with the Miller case and Mr. Johnson has no 
standing to challenge the Miller case which I'm finding to be controlling clearly 
speaks in terms of assignments being voidable as opposed to being void and 
voidable by the parties to the agreement itself. 
[R. 1114 at 33] 
With regard to Johnson's motion to strike, Judge Medley stated that he "surmised" 
that the reason Orvis submitted the Crawley affidavit was in "case this court had some 
concerns about equitable considerations." [Id.] Judge Medley stated he "ha[d] not 
factored in any equitable considerations into this particular decision" and that the matter 
Johnson was attempting to have stricken "was not relied upon by the [c]ourt in rendering 
this decision." [Id.] 
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Judge Medley, on October 26, 2004, signed an order granting Orvis's motion for 
summary judgment and holding that the assignments of the Belding judgment were valid 
and denying Johnson's motion to strike. [R. at 807-808] 
B. Orvis' Motion for Protective Order and Attorneys' Fees 
Johnson had more than 1 1/2 years to conduct any fact discovery he deemed 
necessary before Orvis filed his motion for summary judgment. Johnson did not conduct 
fact discovery during that time, and did not file a Rule 56(f) motion requesting discovery 
before the court ruled on Orvis' motion for summary judgment. Instead, eleven days 
before the hearing on the summary judgment motion, Johnson, on October 4, 2004 at 
6:00 p.m., served Orvis' counsel with a notice of depositions for three depositions, the 
first one to begin the following morning at 9:00 a.m. [R. at 747-48] 
Orvis promptly the next day, on October 5, 2004, moved for a protective order 
and sanctions, arguing that the notice of the depositions was entirely unreasonable and 
that discoveiy was in any event improper given the pending motion for summary 
judgment. [R. at 766-68] 
Judge Medley held a hearing on Orvis' motions at which he granted Orvis' motion 
for a protective order, ordered that no depositions take place during the pendency of 
Orvis' motion for summary judgment, and awarded Orvis his "reasonable attorney's fees 
for seeking the protective order." [R. 1113 at 24-26] At the hearing, Judge Medley 
noted that discovery during the pendency of a motion for summary judgment is generally 
xi 
inappropriate, unless a party files a Rule 56(f) motion, which Johnson did not do. [R. 
1113 at 17] 
Judge Medley went on to hold that, in any event, the notice was unreasonable: 
"It's not often, because of the way Rule 26 and 30 are structured . . . that I get called in to 
deal with scheduling of depositions. When I am called in on these kinds of issues - Fm 
not sure I've ever been called in in a situation where opposing Counsel is served what I 
would consider later in the business day or the evening before the deposition was to take 
place. That seems to me, clearly on its face, does not appear to be reasonable notice." 
[Record 1113 at 10] Judge Medley further held that he had not "heard anything 
compelling that would - that persuades me that the short notice is, under the 
circumstances, reasonable notice, which of course is what the rule requires." [R. 1113 at 
16] 
C. Johnson's Rule 11 Motion 
On November 24, 2004, Johnson filed a Rule 11 motion against Orvis and his 
counsel, Peggy A. Tomsic. [R. at 862-63] The basis for Johnson's motion was that he 
had discovered the investigator, William Crawley, that Ms. Tomsic hired to investigate 
Johnson's finances for purposes of collecting upon a judgment did not possess a private 
investigator's license, and that the Crawley affidavit was improperly submitted. [R. at 
897-907] 
On December 7, 2004, Ms. Tomsic filed an affidavit in which she testified that 
she was not aware when she hired Mr. Crawley that he did not possess a private 
xii 
investigator's license, that she knew that he had done like investigations many times over 
the y ears, and that once she 1 • as infoi med of the situation , she gave Is ii Craw le> no 
further investigative work. [R. at 1052-53] 
Also on December 7, 2004, Orvis filed an opposition to Johnson's Rule 11 motion 
in which he argued that the ,a., . . ..rav\ ic\ am .,ot possess a private investigator's 
license did not Impact the\ eracit} of the information i incovered b> } ii Crawley and 
that, outside of the precise number of times Johnson had appeared as a defendant in the 
State of Utah, Johnson did not dispute the accuracy of anything reported by Mr. Crawley. 
i i 
On February 23, 2005, Mr. Crawley filed an affidavit in which he testified: 
(1) He had been an investigative paralegal for over 18 years, and had 
performed investigate e services for < ' ai ioi is la • > firms thi oi lghoi it Salt I ake City 
as both an employee and independent contract and had been appointed at various 
times by both state and federal courts to provide such investigative paralegal 
services. [R at 1122-23] 
(2) Both he and Ms. Tomsic believed that he was authorized to conduct 
the investigation he conducted of Johnson's financial affairs. [R. at 1122] 
(3) I le I lad "li; 'absolutely no intention of \ iolating the law. It was my 
understanding that if I was working on behalf of an attorney, I was authorized to 
conduct such investigative services." [Id.] 
xni 
(4) He was contacted by the Department of Public Safety concerning 
the issue, cooperated fully with them, and was in the process of obtaining the 
required license.5 [R. 1123-24] 
(5) Outside of one phone call with Johnson's son in which he verified 
the business address of Johnson, his contact with Johnson's children was limited 
solely to his attempts to serve Johnson and his wife DaNell Johnson with 
subpoenas issued by federal court. Once service was effected, he had no further 
contact with Johnson's children. [R. at 1124-25] 
Judge Medley, on March 14, 2005, held a hearing on Johnson's Rule 11 motion, 
at the conclusion of which he denied Johnson's motion. [R. at 1165] On April 29, 2005, 
Judge Medley entered detailed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law supporting his 
ruling denying Rule 11 sanctions, including as follows: 
(1) Orvis moved for summary judgment "on the narrow legal issue of 
whether a judgment owned by plaintiff against defendant should be renewed." [R. 
at 1176] 
(2) Johnson replied making "numerous factual allegations that were 
equitable in nature, and that argued, in effect, that there were equitable reasons 
why defendant should not be held to the judgment owed by him." [Id.] 
5Counsel notes for the record that William Crawley has since obtained a private 
investigator's license. 
xiv 
(3) "In reply, plaintiff submitted an affidavit of William Crawley, an 
investigate e paralegal "\ v I: 1011 11" Is I 'omsic 1 lad I: til e d t 3 look into the finai icial 
affairs of Johnson. Ms. Tomsic submitted the affidavit to counter the equitable 
case Johnson had attempted to make in his opposition." [Id.] 
(4) . • :av..c -*\as required to 
and did not possess a private investigator's license, and Ms. Tomsic did not intend 
in any way to operate outside the law." [R. at 1177] 
(5) 'IVi 1 omsic had a good faith reason to submit the affidavit of Mr. 
(6) "Defendant does not contest the accuracy of the information 
contained in the affidavit of Mr. Crawley, except that he contests the number of 
1 * ; ;,eai * <l^>-: ^ ' » i , ' ' .1 
counter-number or any record support for his contestation." [Id.] 
(7) "Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure does not cover this 
sili mtic ii 01 the actic ns complained aboi it li; ' defendai it "  " |[ I :i ] 
(8) "As noted, Ms. Tomsic had a good faith reason to submit the 
affidavit of Mr. Crawley." "Even, however, were the affidavit deemed irrelevant, 
R 1 ill, ;: 11 does iiot pi c • ' ide sanctions foi submittii ig ii i ele\ ant material " | I :!! ] 
(9) "The fact that Mr. Crawley did not possess a private investigator's 
license is of no legal moment in this proceeding." [Id ] 
xv 
D. Proceedings Before Judge Hanson 
On December 7, 2004, Orvis submitted to Judge Medley the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law signed by Judge Timothy R. Hanson on November 23, 2004 in Orvis 
v. Johnson, Case No. 010907449, in the Third District Court for Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah ("Hanson action") relative to Orvis' motion for summary judgment against 
Johnson. The Hanson action involved the same allegations Johnson made before Judge 
Medley that there was a partnership between Orvis and Johnson relative to the credit 
repair businesses of Orvis. [R. at 1053-60] Judge Hanson made the following factual 
findings, based on the undisputed record, and legal conclusions in holding that Johnson 
did not have a partnership with Orvis, and Orvis was, therefore, entitled to a declaratory 
judgment to that effect. 
(1) Orvis sought in that action [Hanson Action] a declaratory judgment 
that Johnson "has no right, claim or interest relative to any business or venture 
relating to the credit repair business in which plaintiff has any 
ownership." [R. at 1056] 
(2) Johnson "asserts that a partnership exists between him and Orvis 
and that he is therefore entitled to partnership proceeds from intellectual property 
lease payments and consulting fees paid to Orvis by various credit repair entities." 
[14] 
(3) On September 14, 1995, the Small Business Administration 
("SBA") filed a complaint against Jamis Johnson in federal court, United States of 
xvi 
America v. Jamis Johnson, 2:95-CV-838J, in the United States District Court for 
the Cei itral District : f I Jtah: ji ldgi nent s\ as entered against defei idant in that case 
on September 29, 1997. [R. at 1059] 
(4) On November 17, 1999, the SB A deposed Johnson in 
supplementary proceedings in an attempt to identify income or assets of Mr. 
Johnson that the SB \ ecu Ud execi ite I lpon to settle its jri ldgment against J oh nsoi I. 
[R. at 1059] At this November 17, 1999, deposition, Johnson explicitly denied 
having any interest in any partnership or limited liability company: 
"jonnson, under oatn, disavowed any interest, partnersnip or otnerwise, in me 
credit repair business of Orvis. There was no question of mistake. Johnson 
testified us In did s< .i, In ,n TI)
 ; n | | 4 j m n cITorls h\ Ihr SB \ \H .i! I1'!'" u | 
(6) On March 29, 2004, Orvis moved for summary judgment on the 
ground of judicial estoppel, arguing that because Johnson had denied owning any 
partnership interests in his testimony before the SB..A he w as ji idicially e stoppel 
from contradicting that sworn statement and later claiming a partnership interest 
in the credit repair entities of Orvis. [R. at 1057] 
xvii 
(7) On August 9, 2004, Judge Hanson held a hearing on Orvis's motion 
for summary judgment. [R. at 1057] 
(8). "The principle of judicial estoppel prohibits Johnson from asserting 
a different position in this later action from the position to which he testified 
under oath in the SBA case. That is, judicial estoppel will not allow Johnson to 
contradict his testimony before the SBA and claim a partnership interest here." 
[R. at 1058] 
(9) "Johnson has no right, claim or interest in any business, enterprise 
or entity, relating to credit repair, in which Orvis has any ownership interest." [R. 
at 1060] 
xvin 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
motion for summary judgment to renew the Belnap judgment. The undisputed facts were 
that the Belnap judgment had been entered, and Orvis had filed the renewal action within 
8 years o: •:,- . ,uugi:ieiL ^-i L utw , ^ .vmler case, the a^iLaunL'i: , r 
Belnap judgment to Orvis, as a matter of law, was valid, entitling Orvis to summary 
judgment renewing the Belnap judgment. 
Separately and independently, Orvis was entitled to summary judgment renewing 
with Orvis are barred by the rule of res judicata under Judge Hanson's ruling that there 
was no such partnership, j k. 1055-6* * | 
Judge Medley i • :•. disci : tloii in ck c In ling to grant Johnson' s i notion 
to strike the Crawley affidavit. The affidavit was filed by Orvis to counter Johnson's 
"equitable considerations" raised to try to avoid summary judgment, Johnson does not 
on the Crawley affidavit in rendering his decision on summary judgment. 
Finally, Judge Medley did not abuse his discretion in issuing a protective order 
and a \ v ar ding Or v is his attoi ney's fees based oi i Johnson sei * iiig a notice of deposition 
during the pendency of the motion for summary judgment and at 6:00 o'clock p.m. the 
evening before the first deposition was scheduled to begin. 
ARGUMENT 
1 
L ORVIS IS ENTITLED TO RENEWAL OF THE BELDING JUDGMENT, 
AS A MATTER OF LAW, AND JOHNSON'S ALLEGATIONS FLOWING 
FROM AN ALLEGED PARTNERSHIP WITH ORVIS ARE 
IRRELEVANT AND IMMATERIAL. 
Utah law holds that an owner of a judgment may file an action to renew that 
judgment if that action is brought within the eight-year time limit set forth in the Utah 
Code.6 See, e.g.. Mason v. Mason. 579 P.2d 1322 (Utah 1979): Von Hake v. Thomas. 
858 P.2d 193 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). There is a sound basis for that rule, as the Utah 
Supreme Court has stated: If a creditor is not able to renew a judgment, "he has no way 
of preventing the loss of his justly adjudicated claim." Mason. 579 P.2d at 1324 (noting 
difference in this respect between causes of actions and judgments; in the latter case, 
"[t]he owner of the cause of action has already resorted to the court to preserve it and 
unless he can bring another action on the judgment within the eight-year period, he has 
no way of preventing the loss of his justly adjudicated claim.") (emphasis added). 
There are only three essential elements, under Utah law, that Orvis was required 
to establish to obtain a judgment renewing the Belding judgment. Those three elements 
are: (1) the Belnap judgment was entered, (2) the judgment was validly assigned to 
Orvis, and (3) Orvis brought the Medley action within eight years after entry of the 
Belnap judgment. Based on the undisputed record and applicable law, Orvis established 
each of these three elements, and Judge Medley was correct in finding Johnson's 
6Section 78-12-22 of the Utah Code provides that "[a]n action may be brought 
within eight years upon a judgment or decree of any court of the United States, or of any 
territory within the United States." 
2 
allegations relating to an alleged partnership with Orvis immaterial and in renewing the 
Beldii lg judgment as a mat I: :=; i of la;1 * < 7 
The only law on which Johnson relies against the renewal of the Belding 
judgment conflicts with an explicit ruling by the Supreme Court of Utah. Johnson 
alleged belo \ v , and coi i ectb - as it turns out, that t \ II Stai I 'inancial had been 
administratively dissolved when it purchased the judgment from Ms. Belding and when it 
Johnson's allegations against Victor Lawrence and Aii Star Financial must of 
course be disregarded because neither is a party to this case. For example, Johnson has an 
entire section of his brief entitled "Attorney Victor Lawrence" when Mr. Lawrence is not 
even a party. Clearly this Court may not make findings with regard, for example, to civil 
conspiracy against a party not named and who therefore has no dog in this fight. Indeed, 
such a finding would undermine the purpose of requiring joinder under Rule 19 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which is to protect the interests of absent persons. Smith 
v. Osguthorpe, 2002 UT App. 361. T^ 47, 58 P.3d 854. Similarly, Johnson has a section on 
All Star Financial and his allegations regarding All Star Financial are really quite 
astounding given that he has not named All Star Financial and that he has not 
demonstrated any connection whatsoever between Orvis and All Star Financial so that 
what All Star Financial is currently "up to"could even conceivably be relevant to this case 
or to Orvis. 
It should be noted as well that Johnson makes numerous misrepresentations to tllis 
Court. On page 27, for example, Johnson states that Orvis "actually stated that the 
offending affidavit and reply were submitted for an irrelevant and a malicious purpose." 
This is of course also untrue. [R. at 1176] On page 28, Johnson states that Judge Medley 
ordered attorneys' fees with no oral argument. This too is untrue. [R. at 1113] 
One last point - Johnson constantly refers to All Star Financial as a "sham" LLC 
with absolutely no evidence therefor. The fact that All Star Financial is still, according to 
Johnson, conducting business - authorized or no - argues against a conclusion that All 
Star Financial was a "sham" LLC set up by Orvis. 
In sum, while Orvis vigorously disputes all of Johnson's allegations, the foregoing 
are but an example of Johnson's willingness to misdirect this Court by asserting wholly 
irrelevant arguments and making untrue statements with no record support. 
3 
assigned the judgment to Orvis. Johnson, relying on the Utah Code with respect to 
administrative dissolution, unequivocally concludes that the assignments to All Star 
Financial and from All Star Financial are therefore void. But the provisions of the Utah 
Code cited to by Johnson say no such thing, and the Supreme Court of Utah has held the 
precise opposite. 
In Miller v. Celebration Mining Co., 2001 UT 64. ^  6. 29 P.3d 123 L the Supreme 
Court of Utah held that a contract entered into by an administratively dissolved 
corporation is not void, but voidable, by the other party(ies) to that contract. See also 
Paradise Creations, Inc. v. UV Sales. Inc. 315 F.3d 1293, 1310 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
(citing to Miller as "holding that under Utah law, a contract entered into by an 
administratively dissolved corporation may be voided by the other party to the contract, 
but is not automatically void") (emphasis in original). 
Johnson attempts unsuccessfully (and, frankly, confusingly) to read Miller as 
holding other than what it quite clearly does and then cites to two non-Utah cases and an 
entirely irrelevant Utah Court of Appeals case. 
First, Johnson cites to White v. Dvorak, 896 P.2d 85 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995). a 
curious choice because the case comes out entirely the wrong way for Johnson, holding 
as it does, that "[w]hile [a] corporation's lack of capacity affects its ability to enforce a 
contract, the absence of capacity does not invalidate the contract." Id. at 88. Brend v. 
Dome Development Ltd.. 418 N.W.2d 610 fN.D. 1988). does appear to support 
Johnson's position, but it is of course non-binding particularly in light of explicit Utah 
4 
law to the contrary. Murphv v. Crosland, 886 P.2d 74 (Utah App. 1994), does not 
corporation without authority to do so may be held jointly and severally liable for any 
debts and liabilities incurred as a result of their unauthorized actions. 
Judge I\ f exile: > vv as c :« i e ct in holding that Miller conti ols this case, tl lat the 
assignments to and from All Star Financial are not void, no party to the contracts has 
sought to void them, and that Johnson, not being a party to those contracts, has no 
standing to challenge the validity of them, juage ivieuic) 's grant of summary judgment 
to Orvis, therefore, must be I lpheld by this Coi irt. 
II. SHOULD THE COURT, CONTRARY TO UTAH LAW, FIND THAT 
JOHNSON'S ALLEGATIONS WITH RESPECT TO A PARTNERSHIP 
INTEREST WITH ORVIS ARE MATERIAL, THESE ALLEGATIONS 
ARE NONETHELESS BARRED BY RES JUDICATA IJNDER JlIDGE 
HANSON'S RULING OF NO PARTNERSHIP, 
"The doctrine of res judicata serves the important policy of preventing previously 
litigated issues from being relitigated." Youren v. Tintic School District 86 P.3d 771. 
77? (I'lnh "'! I ,p|i "004 I I |ii. »tmg Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co.. 44 P.3d 6 6 J , ,Adl\ 
2002)).8 Because Judge Hanson has ruled that there was and is no partnership between 
8Moreover, res judicata applies notwithstanding the fact that Judge Hanson's 
decision is currently on appeal before this Court. See Youren, 86 P.3d at 773 ("A 
judgment or order, once rendered, is final for purposes of res judicata until reversed on 
appeal or modified or set aside in the court of rendition.") (quoting Copper State Thrift & 
Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387, 390 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)). 
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Johnson and Orvis, Johnson may not attempt to relitigate that issue in the Medley action 
which is the subject of this appeal. [R. 1175-79]. 
Under Utah law, "[r]es judicata encompasses two distinct doctrines: claim 
preclusion and issue preclusion." Id. Johnson's allegation of a partnership (and all 
allegations flowing therefrom) is barred by the doctrine of issue preclusion. Outside of 
Johnson's allegation with respect to the invalidity of the judgment because of the 
administrative dissolution of All Star Financial, all of the allegations Johnson made 
below and on appeal here against the renewal of the Belding judgment are based upon 
Johnson's fundamental allegation of Johnson's partnership with Orvis in Orvis's credit 
repair business. But Judge Hanson has entered a final judgment that no such partnership 
exists. Accordingly, every allegation of Johnson flowing from the supposition of its 
existence is barred by res judicata, issue preclusion, including Johnson's allegation that 
the judgment was purchased with embezzled partnership funds, that the judgment is 
partnership property, and that Orvis owes any sort of fiduciary duty towards Johnson, or 
that he breached any such duty in purchasing the Belding judgment.9 
9Orvis suspects that Johnson may try to cloud this very straightforward issue by 
claiming that DaNell Johnson and not he actually owns the partnership interest. This is 
an argument, however, that must be rejected. To begin with, and as a very elementary 
matter, Johnson cannot give what he does not own. Johnson claims that his wife DaNell 
holds the "beneficial interest" of his partnership in Orvis's credit repair business. But a 
person may not hold a beneficial interest in something that does not exist. Judge Hanson 
ruled that Johnson has no partnership interest in Mr. Orvis's credit repair business; 
DaNell Johnson owns therefore a beneficial interest in nothing. Second, Johnson never 
once limits the ownership of the partnership interest solely to DaNell; while he does 
allege that DaNell holds a beneficial interest, in every one of his pleadings, Johnson refers 
as well to the "Johnsons'" partnership interest. And the "Johnsons" are judicially 
6 
Issue preclusion applies where "(I) the issue decided in the prior adjudication is 
identical to the one presente d in the instant actr : i 1; (2) the pai t> against \ hoi n issi le 
preclusion is asserted was a party, or in privity with a party, to the prior adjudication; and 
(3) the issue in the first action was completely, fully, and fairly litigated; and (4) the first 
MMI M'sutiecJ in n liiml iiidgniuil mi lln; imnils, Buckner v. Kennard, 99 p.3d 842. 847 
(Utah 2004). Each of the required elements is easily met here. 
First, the issue before Judge Hanson is identical to the issue Johnson has raised 
here - name)), did a partnership exist between Johnson and Orvis. 
Second, Johnson, against whom issue preclusion is asserted, w as a part> to the 
prior adjudication. 
Third, the issue of whether there existed a partnership was completely, fully, and 
!:sirh !itip;itni »*»{? -.on made his argument that a partnership existed 11 11 111 lltiple 
pleadings and oral argument before Judge Hanson. [Record at 1057] 
Finally, the suit before Judge Hanson resulted in a final judgment on the merits. 
R es ji idicata ,, therefoi e. bars all of Johnsoi 1" s clain is aga.Ii 1st renew al hei e, as tl lej J 
all flow from a partnership that Judge Hanson has ruled does not exist. Res judicata 
estopped from claiming a partnership interest because Jamis Johnson is judicially 
estopped from claiming a partnership interest. Third, DaNell Johnson is not a party to 
this action, and Johnson cannot assert and ask this Court to adjudicate a right of a 
nonparty. 
7 
requires that this Court disregard all of Johnson's allegations based on and flowing from 
his allegation of a partnership with Orvis.10 
III. JUDGE MEDLEY DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETION IN DECLINING 
TO GRANT JOHNSON'S MOTION TO STRIKE. 
Judge Medley had considerable discretion in determining whether to strike the 
Crawley affidavit, Nelson-Waggoner. 2000 UT at ^ 16, and Johnson has given this Court 
no reason to find that Judge Medley abused that discretion. Judge Medley found that 
Orvis submitted the Crawley affidavit to counter the equitable case Johnson was 
attempting to make against renewal of the Belding judgment. It is ironic indeed then that 
Johnson disputes that he was attempting to make an equitable case below, and therefore 
that the submission of the Crawley affidavit was unjustified, given that Johnson 
continues on appeal to attempt to avoid clear law for what he claims are equitable 
considerations in his favor. For example, on page 42 of the Brief of Appellant, Johnson 
argues: 
There are further considerations here which are equitable defenses that would 
have prevented summary judgment. Reviving a void assignment from the corpse 
of a dissolved LLC is an equitable remedy, not one sounding in law. The law, 
10One of the stated purposes for res judicata is to prevent a litigant from subjecting 
an opponent to, and forcing the opponent to defend himself against, the same allegations 
over and over. As the Supreme Court of Utah has termed it, res judicata exists "[to] 
protect[ ] litigants from harassment by vexatious litigation." Buckner. 99 P.3d at 847. 
Other purposes - "(1) preserving the integrity of the judicial system by preventing 
inconsistent judicial outcomes; [and] (2) promoting judicial economy by preventing 
previously litigated issue from being relitigated," id., - are also served by application here 
of res judicata. At base, Johnson has had his day in court with respect to his allegations 
of a partnership. He lost, and he "does not get a second chance to prevail. . . ." IdL 
8 
UCA48-2C-1203 and 1208 clearly states that All Star, LLC hasn't the capacity to 
deal in these assignments. Equity, however, allows the assignments to escape the 
harsh thrust of the law voiding them, if the parties thereto agree that the 
assignments be kept in force. To keep the assignments alive, equity must step in. 
Johnson then proceeds to discourse on the equitable doctrines of unclean hands and 
laches and to argue based thereon that the Belding judgment should not be renewed. 
Orvis submitted the Crawley affidavit in order to demonstrate that, should Judge 
Medley take equity into consideration, equity did not run in favor of Johnson. 
Moreover, while Johnson is clearly outraged about the Crawley affidavit, he does 
not contest any of the facts discovered by Mr. Crawley. Outside of the precise number of 
times he has appeared as a defendant in the State of Utah (and Johnson does not provide 
a counter-number or any documentation therefor), Johnson does not dispute a single fact 
contained in the Crawley affidavit, such as the worth of his home or the amount that he 
owes to creditors generally and to the Internal Revenue Service and Utah State Tax 
Commission in particular. 
Finally, Judge Medley held that he did not rely on the Crawley affidavit in 
rendering his decision on summary judgment. 
This Court should affirm Judge Medley's Order refusing to strike the Crawley 
affidavit. 
9 
IV. JUDGE MEDLEY DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETION IN ISSUING A 
PROTECTIVE ORDER AND AWARDING ORVIS HIS ATTORNEYS' 
FEES. 
Orvis filed a motion for summary judgment as a matter of law. Normally, as 
Judge Medley found, discovery during the pendency of a motion for summary judgment 
is inappropriate. Where this is not so, a party may file a Rule 56(f) motion requesting 
discovery in the face of a motion for summary judgment. Johnson failed to do so. Judge 
Medley therefore found that any discovery was unwarranted. 
In this context, it is particularly hollow for Johnson to argue there were 
"compelling circumstances" justifying such unreasonable notice. Johnson's argument 
that he needed to depose Paul Schwenke and Victor Lawrence as an emergency matter 
because allegedly Schwenke was going to jail and Lawrence to Greece is nonsense. 
Neither Schwenke nor Lawrence is a party to this matter, counsel for Orvis had never 
sought to depose them, and had no information or interest in their whereabouts or doings. 
Given the foregoing, it would have been an abuse of discretion for Judge Medley 
not to issue a protective order or to award reasonable attorneys' fees. Whatever 
reasonable notice means, it certainly does not mean 6:00 p.m. on the eve before a 
deposition is scheduled to take place. As Judge Medley noted: 
I should not, and it's not my intention to make a personal criticism, but this 
is the first time that I've dealt with a noticed deposition that was noticed or 
served the evening before the day that the deposition was to take place. I 
think that's a highly, highly unusual set of circumstances. 
[Record 1113, at p. 25] 
10 
Judge Medley had considerable discretion in deciding to grant a protective order 
and award Orvis his reasonable attorneys' fees, Schamanek, 684 P.2d at 1266. and he 
clearly did not abuse that discretion. 
V. JUDGE MEDLEY DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
JOHNSON'S RULE 11 MOTION11 
Trial judges have considerable discretion in deciding whether to grant Rule 11 
sanctions. K.F.W. v. T.W. and B.L.W.. 2005 UT App. 85, 110 P.3d 162. In this case, 
Judge Medley considered Johnson's arguments both in pleadings and in oral argument 
and specifically found that Orvis had moved for summary judgment "on the narrow legal 
issue of whether a judgment owned by [Orvis] against [Johnson] should be renewed," [R. 
at 1176]; that, in response, Johnson made "numerous factual allegations that were 
equitable in nature, and that argued, in effect, that there were equitable reasons why 
[Johnson] should not be held to the judgment owed by him," [Id.]; that Orvis submitted 
the Crawley affidavit "to counter the equitable case [Johnson] had attempted to make in 
his opposition," [Id.]; that "Ms. Tomsic had no knowledge that Mr. Crawley was 
required to and did not possess a private investigator's license, and Ms. Tomsic did not 
intend in any way to operate outside the law," [R. at 1177]; that "Ms. Tomsic had a good 
faith reason to submit the affidavit of Mr. Crawley," [Id.]; and that "[Johnson] does not 
contest the accuracy of the information contained in the affidavit of Mr. Crawley." [Id.] 
11
 Johnson did not appeal Judge Medley's Order denying Rule 11 sanctions, and 
this issue is not properly before the Court. Johnson, however, briefed this issue in his 
opening brief, and Orvis has responded in the event the Court addresses and renders a 
decision on this Order. 
11 
These findings are entitled to great deference by this Court. At base, Johnson has 
failed to demonstrate that Rule 11 applies here or, even if it did, that anyone acted 
improperly or in bad faith or that Johnson was harmed in any way. This Court must 
affirm the denial of Johnson's Rule 11 motion. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm Judge Medley's grant of 
summary judgment to Orvis, his grant of a protective order and attorneys' fees to Orvis, 
his denial of Johnson's motion to strike, and his denial of Johnson's Rule 11 motion. 
DATED this otfcttay of September, 2005. 
fOMSk: & PECK LLC 
PeggjML Tomsic 
136EastSouthTemple, #800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee, 
Jayson Orvis 
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1 here — 
2 MR. JOHNSON: I understand. The — her — 
3 THE COURT: You still want to make the argument though? 
4 MR. JOHNSON: Well, her mention of the Lawrence matter 
5 was not in her argument, I didn't have a chance to address that 
6 and I just want to give one thought and I'll leave. 
7 The Hansen motion for summary judgement has been 
8 disregarded by Judge Hansen himself. Orvis is still in the 
9 case and it didn't resolve anything and I argue thaj: it's 
10 different parties and it's irrelevant. That's all, your Honor. 
11 It is not what she said it was. 
12 THE COURT: Okay. 
13 MR. JOHNSON: Thank you for your time, your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Johnson. Listen, before 
15 taking the bench I reviewed the written materials that were the 
16 subject of the motion for summary judgement. I'm now satisfied 
17 as well that I've been apprized as it relates to this motion to 
18 strike. Not that this is significant at all, I did spend some 
19 of my limited law clerk resources on this particular case so I 
2 0 had the benefit of some independent research as to the related 
21 issues and from everything that I've reviewed and considered, 
22 I'm going to rule as follows. 
23 I'm satisfied that the motion for summary judgement is 
24 m fact, very well taken and quite frankly narrow. I mean it 
25 seeks renewal of the judgement because of its narrow scope and 
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1 in this court's view the criteria to be considered is 
2 reasonably narrow and in this court's view it is, in fact, 
3 undisputed again from my vantage point that the complaint to 
4 renew the judgement was timely filed. 
5 That the assignments for a certain purpose of 
6 judgement renewal were in fact and are. in fact valid and 
7 consistent with the Miller case and Mr. Johnson has no standing 
8 to challenge those assignments and from my review of the Miller 
9 case which I'm finding to be controlling clearly speaks in 
10 terms of assignments being voidable as opposed to being void 
11 and voidable by the parties to the agreement itself. 
12 These issues raised by Mr. Johnson and all of the 
13 issues raised by Mr. Johnson as they relate to the partnership 
14 I'm finding to be immaterial to the actual renewal of the 
15 judgement itself and while it's not my intention to make any 
16 prejudgement whatsoever or to offer any invitation whatsoever, 
17 I want to make it clear that I do see a distinction consistent 
18 with Ms. Tomsic's argument about the general principle of 
19 renewal verses enforcement and clearly what is sought in this 
20 particular case is renewal. 
21 As it relates to the motion to strike, I'm going to 
22 deny the motion — I just really — I want to make it clear 
23 that any decision by Judge Hansen quite frankly I gave no 
24 weight to in rendering this particular decision. 
25 The affidavit submitted and I can't recall the persons 
-34-
1 name right now but it's the investigator affidavit. While I 
2 did review those documents in the analytical frame work for 
3 whether or not this motion for summary judgement should be 
4 granted or denied or not, because it really — I struggled with 
5 why it was submitted, number 1 and number 2 I surmised from the 
6 position taken, I think in the memo, that it was submitted in 
7 case this court had some concerns about equitable 
8 considerations and this court has not factored in any equitable 
9 considerations into this particular decision. 
10 Consequently, I really see no utility in granting a 
11 motion to strike because the subject matter upon which — was 
12 an attempt to have stricken was not relied upon by the Court in 
13 rendering this decision. 
14 So for those reasons, I'm going to rule in that matter 
15 and instruct Ms. Tomsic to draft an order consistent with the 
16 ruling and I'll ask, if it's possible and it may not be 
17 possible that that order come to me approved at least as to 
18 form by Mr. Johnson. If it's not possible then submit it 
19 consistent with rule 7 and I'll wait for the appropriate 
20 passage of time and get an order signed and entered. 
21 MS. TOMSIC: Thank you, your Honor. 
22 MR. JOHNSON: Thank you, your Honor. 
23 THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel. 
24 (Hearing concluded.) 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
JAYSON ORVIS, ) PROPOSED 
) ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) CIVIL NO. 020904919 
JAMIS M. JOHNSON, ) 
} Honorable Tyrone Medley 
Defendant. ) 
On October 15, 2004, this matter came before the Court on Plaintiff Jayson 
Orvis's Motion for Summary Judgment and Mr. Johnson's Motion to Strike Orvis Reply 
Memorandum and Affidavit of William Crawley. Mr. Orvis was represented by Peggy A. 
Tomsic. Mr. Johnson appeared pro se. 
Based on the memoranda and argument of the parties, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 
1. Mr. Orvis's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 
' nird Judicial District 
OCT 2 6 2004 
*KE COUNTY 
2. The judgment of Pamela Belding of March 3, 1992 (Utah Fourth Judicial 
Circuit Court, Case No. 920400153) was validly assigned from Ms. Belding to All Star 
Financial, L.L.C. and validly assigned from All Star Financial, L.L.C. to Jayson Orvis. 
3. Mr. Johnson's Motion to Strike Orvis Reply Memorandum and Affidavit of 
William Crawley is denied. 
DATED this f_^ day of October, 2004. 
BY THE COURT: 
<>rK 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct coy of the within and foregoing 
PROPOSED ORDER AND JUDGMENT to be mailed, postage prepaid, this £*S day of 
October, 2004 to the following: 
Jamis M. Johnson 
Johnson & Associates 
352 South Denver Street, Suite 304 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney Pro Se 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAYSON ORVIS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMIS JOHNSON, 
Defendant. 
ORDER REGARDING 
PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Case No. 020904919 
Honorable Tyrone Medley 
In accordance with the ruling made at the hearing held on October 6, 2004 and 
the Affidavit of Peggy A. Tomsic Regarding Attorneys' Fees filed October 7, 2004, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT defendant Jamis Johnson shall pay to Plaintiff 
Jayson Orvis within 30 days of entry of this Order attorneys' fees in the amount of $785. 
r"s Fees ( 
J D16496886 
020904919 JOHNSON.JAMIS 
K 
DATED: October ., 2004. 
•HE COURT: 
5* I "7 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing 
ORDER REGARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES to be mailed, postage prepaid, t h i s ^ _ day 
of October, 2004, to the following: 
Jamis M. Johnson 
Johnson & Associates 
352 South Denver Street, #304 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAYSON ORVIS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs.*' 
JAMIS JOHNSON, 
Defendant. 
JAMIS JOHNSON, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAYSON ORVIS, SAM SPENDLOVE, 
DEON STECKLING, VICTOR 
LAWRENCE, and JOHN DOES 1-15, 
4QRVJS:S HROPOOCD] ^ 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 010907449 
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson 
Third-Party Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Jayson Orvis is the Plaintiff in this Declaratory Judgment action. Orvis 
provides consulting to law firms or businesses providing credit repair services. These 
services consist of assisting in removing false or erroneous entries from the clients' 
credit reports. Additionally, Orvis owns and licenses software, trademarks and trade 
names, and other intellectual property used in the credit repair business to these law 
firms and businesses, through various entities which he has established. Plaintiff seeks, 
in this action, a judgment declaring that the Defendant has no right, claim or interest 
relative to any business or venture relating to the credit repair business in which Plaintiff 
has any ownership. 
2. Defendant Johnson, the Defendant in this case, asserts that a partnership 
exists between him and Orvis and that he is therefore entitled to partnership proceeds 
from intellectual property lease payments and consulting fees paid to Orvis by various 
credit repair entities, including an entity called The Lexington Law Firm. 
3. In addition to claiming a partnership interest in Orvis's credit repair 
businesses, Johnson filed a Third Party Complaint against three third-party defendants, 
including Deon Steckling. In Johnson's Answer and Third Party Complaint, he alleged 
that Steckling, as well as the other third-party defendants, conspired with Orvis to 
exclude Johnson from the partnership interest he allegedly had in Orvis's credit repair 
related businesses. Johnson charged that the third-party defendants had 
2 
interest. They paid me a little, made my payment, and I 
resigned. Now, it's listed as an assumed name by Jamis 
Johnson, they're going to have to go in and change that. But, 
you know, they're operating now without me. 
[Deposition of Jamis Johnson, November 17, 1999, Exhibit 5 to Affidavit of Jayson 
Orvis, at 23:6-24:10]. 
6. On August 8, 2001, the SBA assigned its judgment against Johnson in the 
SBA case to an entity called All Star Financial, L.L.C. 
7. On August 11, 2001, All Star Financial, L.L.C. assigned the judgment 
against Johnson in the SBA case to Orvis. 
8. On March 30, 2004, Plaintiff Jayson Orvis filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment arguing that the doctrine of judicial estoppel precluded Johnson from 
claiming a partnership interest in any credit repair business of Orvis because of 
Johnson's testimony under oath before the SBA. Third-party defendant Steckling 
joined in Orvis's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
11. On August 9, 2004, the Court held a hearing on Orvis's and Steckling's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based on the foregoing findings of fact, the Court makes the following 
conclusions of law. 
4 
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1. The principle of judicial estoppel prohibits Johnson from asserting a 
different position in this later action from the position to which he testified under oath in 
the SB A case. That is, judicial estoppel will not allow Johnson to contradict his 
testimony before the SBA and claim a partnership interest here. See Salt Lake City v. 
Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 913 P.2d 731, 734 (Utah 1995) (the purpose of judicial 
estoppel is "to uphold the sanctity of oaths, thereby safeguarding the integrity of the 
judicial process from conduct such as knowing misrepresentations or fraud on the 
court."). 
2. Judicial estoppel does not require that the parties to the prior and present 
litigation be the same. See International Resources v. Dunfield. 599 P.2d 515, 517, n.4 
(Utah 1979) (noting "a concededly overbroad statement in [the Court's] case of Tracy 
Loan and Trust Co. v. Ooenshaw Inv. Co.. et aL 102 Utah 509. 132 P.2d 388. to the 
effect that one would not be 'judicially estopped' unless the parties and the issues are 
the same in the instant and the prior suit. Any misstatement of the rule was corrected 
and superseded by our decision in Richards v. Hodson. [485 P.2d 1044 (Utah 1971)]"). 
3. Even if Utah law requires that the parties to the prior and present 
proceedings be the same in order for judicial estoppel to apply, such is not 
determinative in this case because Orvis, having purchased and having been assigned 
the judgment owned by the SBA, is in privity with the SBA. See 47 Am. Jur. 2d 
Judgments § 663 (2004) ("a privy is one who, after the commencement of the action, 
5 
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misappropriated the funds of the alleged partnership and had been unjustly enriched 
thereby. 
4. Prior to Orvis's filing of the Declaratory Judgment Action, Johnson was 
sued by the Small Business Administration ("SBA"), and judgment was entered against 
him in that case on September 29, 1997. United States of America v. Jamis Johnson, 
2:95-CV-838J, in the United States District Court for the Central District of Utah. 
5. In post-judgment supplemental proceedings for collection purposes in the 
SBA case, Johnson was deposed by the SBA. In his deposition, Johnson, under oath, 
disavowed any interest, partnership or otherwise, in the credit repair business of Orvis. 
There was no question of mistake. Johnson testified as he did so as to avoid collection 
efforts by the SBA. Johnson testified, under oath: 
Q: Do you have any interest in any partnership? 
A: No. 
Q: Any interest in any limited liability companies? 
A: No. 
[Deposition of Jamis Johnson, November 17, 1999, Exhibit 6 to Affidavit of Jayson 
Orvis, at 30:16-31:4]. 
A: Lexington Law Firm, Victor Lawrence and another attorney 
have taken over all of that. I've indemnified them, they have 
indemnified me. I've resigned from any relationship.... 
Lexington Law FirmQ was in my name, but since that time and 
with my bar problem, I have completely relinquished any 
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has acquired an interest in the subject matter affected by the judgment through or 
under one of the parties, as by . . . assignment."); Searle Brothers v. Searle, 588 P.2d 
689 (1978) (The legal definition of a person in privity with another, is a person so 
identified in interest with another that he represents the same legal right. This includes 
a mutual or successive relationship to rights in property.). 
Based on the foregoing, the Court grants Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment and dismisses Johnson's counterclaim against Plaintiff with prejudice. The 
Court will enter a Declaratory Judgment that Johnson has no right, claim or interest in 
any business, enterprise or entity, relating to credit repair, in which Orvis has any 
ownership interest. The Court also grants Deon Steckling's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and dismisses the Third Party Complaint against him with prejudice. 
DATED this ^ ^ of November, 2004. 
BY T?HE COURT: 
h/As , 
Honorable Timoth 
/Third Judicial Disti 
Salt Lake County, 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on October 29, 2004,1 caused a true and correct copy 
of [JAYSON ORVIS'S PROPOSED] FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Jamis M. Johnson 
Johnson & Associates 
352 South Denver Street 
#304 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Blake S. Atkin 
Atkin & Hawkins 
136 South Main Street, #610 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Third Party Defendants 
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Peggy A. Tomsic (3879) 
Heather Keele (10347) 
TOMSIC LAW FIRM 
136 East South Temple, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)532-1995 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Jayson Orvis 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAYSON ORVIS, I 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ; 
JAMIS JOHNSON, j 
Defendant. ] 
) ORDER RE: DEFENDANT'S 
) MOTION FOR SANCTIONS 
) Case No. 020904919 
) Honorable Tyrone Medley 
On March 14, 2005, this matter came before the Court on Defendant's Motion 
for Rule 11 Sanctions Against Plaintiff Orvis, Attorney Tomsic, and her law firm, 
Berman, Tomsic & Savage. Plaintiff Jayson Orvis was represented by Peggy A. 
Tomsic and Heather Keele. Defendant Jamis Johnson appeared pro se. 
The Court, having reviewed the motion and the supporting and opposing 
memoranda, and having heard oral argument on the motion; 
\nz 
Th!wD, 'STR,CT COURT 
T h
"d Judicial District 
MAY - 2 2005 
KE COUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions is 
denied. 
DATED: March , 2005. 
BYTHE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
TOMSIC LAW FIRM, LLC. 
^egqv A. Tomsic >eggy 
Heather Keele 
PROSE 
Jamis Johnson 
\V-T«, 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing 
ORDER RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS to be sent by facsimile and 
mailed, postage prepaid, t h i s / ^ day of •March, 2005, to the following: 
Jamis M. Johnson 
Johnson & Associates 
352 South Denver Street, #304 
Salt Lake City, UT84111 
n 
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FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
Peggy A. Tomsic (3879) 
Heather Keele (10347) 
TOMSIC LAW FIRM 
136 East South Temple, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)532-1995 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Jayson Orvis 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAYSON ORVIS, 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ; 
JAMIS JOHNSON, ] 
Defendant. ] 
i ORDER 
) Case No. 020904919 
I Honorable Tyrone Medley 
On March 14, 2005, this matter came before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion for 
Contempt against Defendant. Plaintiff Jayson Orvis was represented by Peggy A. 
Tomsic and Heather Keele. Defendant Jamis Johnson appeared pro se. 
The Court, having reviewed the motion and the supporting and opposing 
memoranda, and having heard oral argument on the motion, HEREBY ORDERS 
1. Defendant shall pay the attorneys' fees ordered by the Court on November 
03, 2004 to Plaintiff within 90 days of the March 14, 2005 hearing. 
MAY - 2 2005 
J y ^ A L T LAKE COUNTY yaf— 
f ^ Deputy Clerk 
\\A-\ 
2. The Court shall hold Plaintiffs Motion for Contempt in abeyance, to be 
renewed if Defendant fails to pay the attorneys' fees as ordered. 
DATED: March2^, 2005. 
BVTHE COURT: 
^Honorable Tyrone Medley 
Thira District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
TOMSIC LAW FIRM, LLC. 
Peggy A. Tomsic 
Heather Keele 
^M/of 
PROSE 
Jamis Johnson 
l\CL"7 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing 
ORDER to be sent by mail, postage prepaid, this £f£ day of T&arett; 2005, to the 
following: 
Jamis M. Johnson 
Johnson & Associates 
352 South Denver Street, #304 
Salt Lake City, UT84111 
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FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
Peggy A. Tomsic (3879) 
Heather Keele (10347) 
TOMSIC LAW FIRM 
136 East South Temple, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)532-1995 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Jayson Orvis 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAYSON ORVIS, \ 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ) 
JAMIS JOHNSON, ] 
Defendant. ] 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
I CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
I Case No. 020904919 
I Honorable Tyrone Medley 
On March 14, 2005, this matter came before the Court on Defendant's Motion for 
Rule 11 Sanctions Against Plaintiff Orvis, Attorney Tomsic, and her law firm, Berman, 
Tomsic & Savage. Plaintiff Jayson Orvis was represented by Peggy A. Tomsic and 
Heather Keele. Defendant Jamis Johnson appeared pro se. 
The Court, having reviewed the motion and the supporting and opposing 
memoranda, and having heard oral argument on the motion, hereby makes the 
following findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
WV5 
MAY - 2J005 
Deputy Clerk 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On March 26, 2004, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on the 
narrow legal issue of whether a judgment owned by Plaintiff against Defendant should 
be renewed. 
2. Defendant opposed Plaintiff's motion June 1, 2004. In Defendant's 
opposition, he made numerous factual allegations that were equitable in nature, and 
that argued, in effect, that there were equitable reasons why Defendant should not be 
held to the judgment owed by him. 
3. In reply, Plaintiff submitted an affidavit of William Crawley, an investigative 
paralegal whom Ms. Tomsic had hired to look into the financial affairs of Defendant. 
Ms. Tomsic submitted the affidavit to counter the equitable case Defendant had 
attempted to make in his opposition. 
4. As Defendant later learned and informed Ms. Tomsic, Mr. Crawley did not 
possess a private investigator's license when conducting his investigation of 
Defendant's financial affairs. 
5. On November 24, 2004, Defendant filed the instant motion alleging a Rule 
11 violation because Mr. Crawley did not possess a private investigator's license when 
investigating his financial affairs and because Ms. Tomsic submitted the affidavit, 
which, according to Defendant, was irrelevant and scandalous. 
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5. Ms. Tomsic had no knowledge that Mr. Crawley was required to and did 
not possess a private investigator's license, and Ms. Tomsic did not intend in any way 
to operate outside the law. 
6. Ms. Tomsic had a good faith reason to submit the affidavit of Mr. Crawley 
7. Defendant does not contest the accuracy of the information contained in 
the affidavit of Mr. Crawley, except that he contests the number of times he has 
appeared as a defendant in the State of Utah, but does not provide a counter-number 
or any record support for his contestation. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
8. Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure does not cover this situation 
or the actions complained about by Defendant. 
9. As noted, Ms. Tomsic had a good faith reason to submit the affidavit of Mr. 
Crawley. 
10. Even, however, were the affidavit deemed irrelevant, Rule 11 does not 
provide for sanctions for submitting irrelevant material. 
11. The fact that Mr. Crawley did not possess a private investigator's license is 
of no legal moment in this proceeding. 
12. Defendant's Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions is denied. 
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DATED: March , 2005 
BY TitfE COURT: 
\\~I4D 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
TOMSIC LAW FIRM, LLC. 
Peggy A. Tomsic 
Heather Keele 
PROSE 
Jamis Johnson 
\\~tf 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to be sent by facsimile and mailed, postage 
prepaid, this *$£_ day of March, 2005, to the following: 
Jamis M. Johnson 
Johnson & Associates 
352 South Denver Street, #304 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
\\$P 
